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ABSTRACT 
Whether and how violence can be controlled to spare innocent lives is a central issue in 
international relations. The most ambitious effort to date has been the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), designed to enhance security and safety by preventing egregious human rights 
abuses and deterring international crimes. We offer the first systematic assessment of the ICC’s 
deterrent effects for both state and non-state actors.  While no institution can deter all actors, the 
ICC can deter some governments and those rebel groups that seek legitimacy. We find support 
for this conditional impact of the ICC cross-nationally. Our work has implications for the study 
of international relations and institutions, and supports the violence-reducing role of pursuing 
justice in international affairs. 
 
 
One of the most important questions in international policy and research is whether 
justice is possible in a system dominated by self-regarding sovereign states. The International 
Criminal Court (ICC) provides a challenging opportunity to probe the possibilities for 
international law to reduce human suffering in inter- and intra-state conflict. The Court has 
jurisdiction in a domain where military and strategic logic generally prevails, though it does not 
have its own police force and must instead rely on domestic law enforcement or third parties to 
arrest people charged with crimes under its jurisdiction. The ICC’s task is inherently difficult: it 
can prosecute state agents, including heads of state, as well as non-state actors such as rebel 
group leaders over whom international institutions traditionally have scant authority. Its goals are 
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ambitious: the attainment of peace and security, as well as justice for those who commit 
atrocities. Is the Court contributing to achieving these goals, as its original drafters envisioned? 
In particular, under what conditions can the ICC reduce egregious human rights violations 
against civilians?  
The question of the ICC’s impact is important because the court has the authority to 
enforce international law against those who commit the most serious and systematic crimes.  We 
examine the ICC’s ability to deter one of the most dastardly international crimes: the widespread 
and intentional killing of civilians in states that have experienced civil wars in their recent past. 
We take a broad view of deterrence and explicate both its prosecutorial as well as social 
dimensions. Prosecutorial deterrence is a direct consequence of legal punishment: it holds when 
potential perpetrators reduce or avoid law-breaking for fear of being tried and officially punished.  
Social deterrence is a consequence of the broader social milieu in which actors operate: it occurs 
when potential perpetrators calculate the informal consequences of law-breaking.   
A judicial institution is at its most powerful when prosecutorial and social deterrence 
reinforce one another, which happens when actors threaten to impose extra-legal costs for non-
compliance with legal authority.  Recognizing this complementary relationship between formal 
prosecution and informal compliance pressures, we argue that the ICC’s influence may go well 
beyond the common assertion that the institution has no teeth. There are multiple mechanisms – 
legal and social, international and domestic – associated with the ICC’s authority that can 
potentially deter law violation in countries prone to civil violence.   
At the same time, we acknowledge what few would have doubted: the ICC’s contribution 
to deterrence is conditional. On average, it has stronger positive effects on governments than on 
rebels. We also acknowledge that the ICC has so far had little effect in some countries where it 
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has intervened with indictments (Sudan and Libya, for example), but in other cases, ICC 
jurisdiction has mobilized domestic actors and stimulated important domestic reforms (weak yet 
notable improvements can be seen in Uganda, Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, for example).  Overall, 
our results contrast with the predictions of those who view the ICC as a worthless institution – or 
worse. 
 
Research on the Effects of the ICC 
There are many standards by which international criminal justice institutions such as the 
ICC can be judged. They may be evaluated based on their contribution to justice,1 on their 
normative value,2 on their capacity to offer societal “atonement,”3 and on their legitimacy in the 
eyes of local victims.4  As a “renewed commitment to international idealism,”5 the ICC almost 
by definition raises hopes and expectations beyond anything we have seen since the Nuremburg 
and Tokyo trials. And yet its critics are rife. Some view it as incapable of calibrating threats and 
rewards to coerce an end to wartime atrocities.6  Others see it as an institution whose success is 
regularly frustrated by local and regional politics.7 
Some of the most heated debates over the ICC relate to the effect it may have on the 
dynamics of peacemaking. For example, Snyder and Vinjamuri argue that international 
prosecutions can discourage pragmatic bargaining between warring parties and block the use of 
amnesty that could usher in peace.8 Similarly, Goldsmith and Krasner warn that “the ICC could 
                                                          
1Goodman and Jinks 2003. 
2Bass 2003. 
3Bikundo 2012. 
4Clark 2011. 
5Goldsmith and Krasner 2003, 48. 
6Mendeloff 2014. 
7Mueller 2014. 
8Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003. 
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initiate prosecutions that aggravate bloody political conflicts and prolong political instability in 
the affected regions.”9  Practically no systematic evidence has been produced to date to support 
such concerns. In fact, other studies have found suggestive evidence that a government’s 
ratification of the ICC tends to be correlated with a pause in civil war hostilities10 or reduction in 
human rights violations.11 Sikkink’s research on domestic trials suggests that prosecutions have 
been associated with human rights improvements. Certainly, the history of impunity has hardly 
racked up a stunning record for peace.12 There may be some cases in which the unreasonable 
insistence on prosecution could be antithetical to the more practical idea of making deals and 
compromising with atrocity offenders, and we do not deny that carefully calibrated amnesties 
may in some circumstances support peace processes,13 but as a general matter there is little 
evidence to suggest the peace versus justice tradeoff is anything other than a false dichotomy.   
A related but distinct issue is whether the ICC can deter the specific crimes it is designed 
to address. After all, the ICC does not outlaw war; it outlaws specific violations of the laws of 
war, those “limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole” including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.14 Does the ICC deter such 
crimes by raising the risk of punishment for the worst offenses? Again, skeptics abound. 
Goldsmith and Krasner assert flatly that to think the ICC may saves lives “is wishful thinking.”15   
Ku and Nzelibe argue that ICC deterrence is undercut because it depends on states’ willingness 
to cooperate and cannot impose the death penalty.16 Cronin-Furman similarly concludes that the 
                                                          
9Goldsmith and Krasner 2003, 55. 
10Simmons and Danner 2010. 
11Mitchell and Powell 2011. 
12Sikkink 2011. 
13Lessa and Payne 2012. 
14Rome Statute, Article 5(1) (a//---//c).  
15Goldsmith and Krasner 2003, 55. 
16Ku and Nzelibe 2006. 
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absence of severe punishment and low probability of capture makes the ICC deterrent effect 
weak.17 Fish calls the ICC’s deterrent effect “weak”18 and “speculative”19 while Ainley calls it 
“as yet unproven.”20 Specialists in criminal justice point out that the ICC simply does not have 
the resources to make punishment a real risk.21 We would simply point out the inconsistency 
among some of the ICC’s most ardent critics: it is odd to argue that the court’s weakness renders 
it unable to deter crime, and yet to claim that the Court exacerbates conflict by (credibly, 
apparently) threatening to punish perpetrators, who are thereby supposedly incentivized to elude 
justice and continue fighting.  
Our investigation avoids generalized claims and instead advances conditional arguments 
about ICC deterrence, flowing both from its formal authority to prosecute and its focal power as 
a socially relevant justice institution. We are careful to craft arguments conditional on who is 
expected to be deterred. We argue first that ICC jurisdiction increases the risk of prosecution 
compared to impunity, and that this can deter some individuals from committing crimes, 
especially when the ICC signals its will and capacity to prosecute. But acknowledging the 
uncertainty of being tried and punished, we argue the ICC is more likely to deter actors when 
they are sensitive to social pressure. Actors who are concerned with their legitimacy in the eyes 
of domestic publics and/or the international community are much more likely to be deterred by 
the possibility of ICC prosecution than those who are not. 
 
A Theory of the ICC’s Conditional Impact 
                                                          
17Cronin-Furman 2013. 
18 Fish 2010, 1708. 
19 Ibid., 1709 
20 Ainley 2011, 309. 
21See Rodman 2008; and Mullins and Rothe 2010. 
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How can an international institution with broad legal authority to enforce the law, but 
only limited material capacity, influence the course of civil war violence? We specify two broad 
channels of deterrence: prosecutorial deterrence and social deterrence. Prosecutorial deterrence 
works via anticipated legalized, court-ordered punishment. Social deterrence results from extra-
legal social costs associated with law violation. Both of these channels can be accommodated in 
a framework that views the propensity to commit a crime as a function of the likelihood of 
getting caught and the cost of punishment, broadly understood.22 This framework assumes, of 
course, that potential perpetrators are aware of and can weigh risks, costs and benefits, and 
update their assessments over time. 
 
Prosecutorial Deterrence 
Prosecutorial deterrence refers to the omission of a criminal act out of fear of sanctions 
resulting from legal prosecution. People are increasingly likely to be deterred from violating the 
law when the chances and severity of a legal sanction, such as a fine, incarceration or capital 
punishment, increases. As such, law violation is a function of prosecution and sentencing; as the 
risk of more severe penalties is perceived to increase, the likelihood that an individual will 
commit a crime is reduced and the crime rate falls (holding any “utility” resulting from the 
violation constant).    
For decades, the criminal deterrence literature has debated the question of exactly which 
elements of this rationalist model account for the deterrence of criminal behavior. The idea that 
severity of punishment largely drives deterrence23 fueled the move toward harsher sentencing in 
the United States in the 1980s. However, a growing consensus in the deterrence literature 
                                                          
22Becker 1968. 
23Grasmick and Bryjak 1980. 
9 
 
suggests that the swiftness and especially the likelihood of punishment may more effectively 
deter crime than severity of punishment.24 Empirical researchers employing surveys, 
experiments and scenarios also conclude that the likelihood of punishment is key for deterring 
crimes ranging from tax evasion to theft to sexual assault.25 Observational studies often find that 
measures that raise the risk of apprehension, such as increased policing26 or the greater presence 
of cell phones27 reduce crime.    
While the criminology literature is exceptionally thin in parts of the world where ICC 
jurisdiction currently looms large, many of the same themes are common. A large study affiliated 
with the World Bank based on developing countries found that higher conviction rates tended to 
reduce crime, even while controlling for the death penalty.28 Major texts on criminal deterrence 
in Africa agree that the key to crime control in most contexts in Africa is not the severity of 
punishment, but its likelihood.29 A growing literature on the role of courts in authoritarian states 
reveals that courts can sometimes gain a good deal of independence from political actors,30 and 
thus potentially deter some kinds of lawbreaking. But even states with less robust judicial 
systems where elites may have become accustomed to operating above the law, the theoretical 
role of raising perceived risks of prosecution has been widely accepted as a starting point in a 
wide range of contexts. 
Raising the risk of punishment where the rule of law is otherwise weak is precisely the 
formal role envisioned for the ICC. The Court was designed to do this  through its own authority 
to prosecute. The Court’s jurisdiction applies to cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
                                                          
24See Kleiman 2009; and Wright 2010.  
25See Nagin and Paternoster 1993; and Nagin 1998. 
26Klick and Tabarrok 2010. 
27Klick, MacDonald, and Stratmann 2012. 
28Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 1998. 
29Mushanga 2011, 10, 122, 266. 
30Moustafa 2014. 
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egregious human rights violations, and war crimes31 that occurred after July 1, 2002 in the 
territory of a state that has ratified the treaty or that is committed by a national of such a state or 
in cases referred to it by the UN Security Council.32 The Office of the Prosecutor ultimately 
decides which cases to pursue, but cases may be referred by member states (e.g., Uganda, the 
DRC, the Central African Republic, and Mali), the Security Council (Sudan and Libya), or 
initiated by the prosecutor herself (Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire). Importantly, immunities of local 
officials are not to be recognized by the Court.33   
Prosecutorial deterrence is possible only if the Court’s existence and actions raise the 
perceived likelihood that an individual will be tried and punished. To date, the ICC prosecutor 
has indicted more than 35 people, and a further 9 cases (involving Afghanistan, Honduras, Korea, 
Nigeria, Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, Palestine, and Ukraine) are under preliminary examination 
for jurisdiction and admissibility. Prosecutorial deterrence theory implies that investigations, 
indictments and especially successful prosecutions should trigger a reassessment of the 
likelihood of punishment and a boost to deterrence34 – a result consistent with Kim and 
Sikkink’s study of national human rights trials in transition countries.35  But even if suspects are 
never apprehended, one costly result of the ICC regime, as Gilligan demonstrates theoretically, is 
that perpetrators have fewer asylum options, which potentially deters them from flagrant 
violations.36 
The Rome Statute’s complementarity regime creates a channel for the ICC to support 
prosecutorial deterrence at the national level as well. The ICC is designed to complement, and 
                                                          
31 We refer to these below as “ICC crimes” or “international crimes.” 
32Rome Statute, Article 12(2); Chapter VIII covers UNSC authority to refer.   
33Ibid., Article 27. 
34Geerken and Gove 1975. 
35Kim and Sikkink 2010. 
36Gilligan 2006.   
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not to preempt or substitute for national prosecution. National courts have the option of 
investigating a case domestically before the ICC can adjudicate it.37 The ICC may nonetheless 
find a case admissible despite domestic action if the Court determines that “the state is unwilling 
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”38 Sudan’s desultory 
investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed in Darfur provide an example of the kind of 
behavior the admissibility provisions were designed to override.39  
This complementarity principle bolsters the ICC’s prosecutorial deterrence to the extent 
that it creates incentives for states to strengthen their own legal capacities.40 The ICC report to 
the United Nations notes several reforms that came after the launch of preliminary examinations, 
including reforms in Guinea, Colombia, and Georgia.41 Nouwen documents how ICC 
investigations catalyzed legal reforms in the DRC and Sudan.42 Uganda’s ICC-implementing 
legislation was passed only recently, in 2010, but it empowers the Ugandan High Court to 
prosecute international crimes.43 Thus, an indirect channel through which the ICC may exert 
prosecutorial deterrence is through stimulating national courts to act,44 theoretically creating 
favorable conditions for internal monitoring and law enforcement, bolstering prosecutorial 
deterrence. Arguably, national courts have contributed to a broader system-wide expectation that 
impunity is no longer quietly tolerated.45  
                                                          
37See Rome Statute, Preamble and Article1.  For a discussion of the conditions under which domestic courts are 
likely to enforce international human rights law, see Lupu 2013. 
38Rome Statute, Article 17(1)(a). 
39ICC 2006. 
40Dunoff and Trachtman 1999. This idea is termed “positive complementarity” in legal research. See Burke-White 
2010. 
41ICC 2011. 
42Nouwen 2014. 
43Nouwen and Werner 2011. 
44Stahn and El Zeidy 2011. 
45Sikkink 2011.   
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In sum, prosecutorial deterrence is expected to be enhanced by any condition that makes 
prosecution more likely in a given jurisdiction, such as ratification of the Rome Statutes, passage 
of ICC-implementing legislation, national trials, or court reforms that make trials more probable 
and credible.46 Qualitative research reveals such changes become part of leaders’ updated 
calculations. For example, former Colombian President Andrés Pastrana expressed concerns that 
he might get prosecuted by the ICC, and the paramilitary leader, Vincente Castano, of the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), was “sharply aware and fearful of the possibility of 
ICC prosecution, a fear that reportedly directly contributed to his demobilization.”47 Even some 
rebel groups have begun to assess risks in the ICC’s shadow. For example, the two main rebel 
groups in Colombia – the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC-EP) and the 
Unión Camilista - Ejército de Liberación Nacional (UC-ELN) – have published internal 
documents assessing the likelihood of prosecution by the ICC or domestic courts.48 ICC 
investigations, indictments and convictions or those triggered by complementarity are likely to 
encourage actual or potential perpetrators to reassess the risks of punishment – relative to the 
status quo, which is often impunity – and to moderate their behavior.  
 
Social Deterrence 
A narrow focus on prosecution is likely to underestimate the full deterrent effect of the 
Court. The ICC is the institutional manifestation of a movement, years in the making, to punish 
international crimes and to put them firmly beyond the pale. Quite aside from its formal power to 
                                                          
46On the phenomenon of “enforcement spillovers,” by which monitoring and enforcement increases compliance 
even in areas without monitoring or enforcement, see Rincke and Traxler 2011. 
47Grono 2012. 
48O’Brien, Engstrom, and Cantor 2011.  
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prosecute, the Court’s legal mandate signals the nature and strength of community norms.49 
When community norms are challenged in a clear way (signaled, for example, by ICC actions or 
statements), there is significant potential for a social reaction to law violations.  
The concept of social deterrence has been central to behavioral models in criminology for 
decades.50 In their research on criminal behavior, Zimring and Hawkins noted long ago that 
threatened consequences include “social reactions that may provide potential offenders with 
more reason to avoid conviction than the officially imposed unpleasantness of punishment.”51  
Experimental research suggests that potential offenders are often deterred from violating the law 
more as a result of the anticipated social response than the likelihood of prosecution and 
punishment by formal legal processes.52 Indeed some studies conclude that “the extralegal 
consequences from conviction appear to be at least as great a deterrent as the legal 
consequences.”53 Social deterrence depends for its effectiveness on the expression of clear 
standards of behavior as well as enhanced monitoring.54 Kahan emphasizes that law signals 
information about what a broader community values.55 The willingness of a community to 
defend its values informally must be taken into account by a would-be offender.   
The social consequences of violation can range from the psychic costs of stigmatization 
to the material costs of being shunned from profitable relationships. The central characteristic of 
social deterrence is its informal, extralegal character, as distinct from the likelihood of formal 
prosecution. One social cost of a common crime might be that it is harder to get a job, not 
because one would be legally barred, but because many people do not want to hire – or even to 
                                                          
49Kahan 1997. 
50See Williams and Hawkins 1986; and McCarthy 2002. 
51Zimring and Hawkins 1973, 174. 
52See Tittle 1980; and Tittle, Botchkovar, and Antonaccio 2011. 
53Nagin and Pogarsky 2001, 865. 
54Agnew 2011. 
55Kahn 1997. 
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be seen to hire – a criminal. Social deterrence, as this example illustrates, does not correspond 
directly to material versus intangible sanctions. In the theory we advance, extrajudicial actors 
may shun or shame offenders; those with resources may potentially deploy material pressures 
extralegally to advance community values. Importantly, this range of informal social pressure is 
both elicited and legitimated by the normative focal power of a criminal tribunal. 
Social deterrence is a central feature of research on compliance with international human 
rights norms, which are notoriously difficult to enforce internationally. That literature recognizes 
that international norms are largely enforced through extralegal means: by transnational 
organizations that publicize violations and ally with states and international organizations to 
condemn them.56 Hafner-Burton emphasizes international social pressures backed by economic 
sanctions.57 One conclusion to which the human rights literature clearly points is the central 
importance of extralegal deterrents to law violation. More broadly, social deterrence is 
emphasized in compliance research where legitimacy of rules and authority plays a critical role 
in deterring crimes and inducing compliance.58 In fact, it may be especially relevant precisely 
when norms are strong but the formal institutions of law – policing, courts, and formal 
confinement capacities – are weak.  
The concept of social deterrence has largely been missing from accounts of how and why 
the ICC is a potentially powerful institution. This relative silence is ironic since one key purpose 
of the ICC is to set expectations, thereby placing some tactics outside the boundary of acceptable 
behavior. As the world’s first permanent and global criminal court, the ICC is especially central 
in defining international society’s response to international crimes. In this spirit, Koskenniemi 
                                                          
56Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999.  
57Hafner-Burton 2013. 
58See Franck 1990; and Tyler 2006. 
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views international criminal trials as enabling the formation of a “moral community,”59 while 
Akhavan refers to the “socio-pedagogical influence of judicial stigmatization,”60 which he 
characterizes as subtle, but potentially quite far-reaching. 
Our argument about the capacity of the ICC to stimulate social deterrence is compatible 
with this literature. Law violation in the presence of ICC authority crosses a fairly bright line that 
the international community as a whole values and therefore has an interest in maintaining. State 
officials and rebel groups vary in their sensitivity to the values of the international community; 
integration into global networks and dependence on the approval of foreign actors critical to 
strengthening the ICC in the first place61 may well enhance external social deterrence.   
Domestic communities may be also highly relevant to social deterrence, as is well-
documented in the human rights literature. Simmons argues for the importance of domestic 
mobilization for deterring human rights violations of ratified treaties.62 Parties to a civil conflict 
must consider their ability to maintain support from civilian populations and their own troops in 
the event of an ICC investigation. A war crime accusation could severely damage a 
government’s or rebel group’s relationship with domestic populations. Civil societies may be 
emboldened by the ICC to mobilize for some form of justice, petitioning the cases to national 
courts and potentially providing evidence to the ICC.63   
We are not suggesting that all civil society members will want to turn to the ICC. In 
Uganda, for example, Acholi leaders suggested traditional restorative justice rather than the 
ICC,64 but even in this case, the ICC galvanized the local discussion on accountability norms and 
                                                          
59Koskenniemi 2002. 
60 Akhavan 2005, 419.  
61Goodliffe and Hawkins 2009. 
62See Simmons 2009; and Neumayer 2005. 
63See McKay 2004; and Hillebrecht 2014. 
64Clark 2011. 
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(as intended by the ICC’s complementarity principle) stimulated domestic demands for reform of 
the justice system.65 Scholars have also documented the supportive role of civil society actors 
during ICC investigations in the Central African Republic.66 In Kenya, some supporters of 
Kenyatta and Ruto quite obviously did not want the ICC to try their leaders67 and the 
government commenced a relentless campaign against the ICC (to include Kenya’s withdrawal 
from the institution). Even so, in late 2011 nearly 60 percent of Kenyans supported the ICC 
process, rising to nearly 70 percent in Nairobi and 86 percent in the Nyanza region. Moreover, 
77 per cent of Kenyans polled said they had followed the ICC proceedings naming the Ocampo 
Six very closely.68 These cases illustrate why it may be important to supplement an 
understanding of the ICC’s prosecutorial deterrence power with its broader ability to mobilize 
extralegal pressures. As the ICC takes action, it not only raises expectations of prosecution; it 
shapes social expectations about what constitutes justice more broadly. 
 
Theoretical Expectations 
Our analysis suggests that the ICC’s effects may be much more nuanced than discussions 
of its formal capacities recognize. The ICC may have varying effects on different categories of 
actors, depending on (1) their exposure to the risk of prosecution and (2) the importance they 
attach – or the vulnerability they believe they have – to the social costs of criminal law violation.  
First, we expect prosecutorial deterrence to depend on state ratification, which is the 
primary mechanism for the Court to gain jurisdiction.  The absolute risk of punishment by the 
ICC remains small, but it is not negligible and is much higher than was the case when impunity 
                                                          
65Nouwen 2014. 
66Glasius 2009a. 
67See Chaudoin 2014; and Mueller 2014. 
68Ipsos-Synovate 2011. 
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was the default.  Of course, government and rebel forces may believe that prosecution is a 
remote possibility and may be more sensitive to risks of crude retribution by their enemies than 
to the threat of ICC prosecution. Or, a government may have ratified to make rebel prosecution 
more likely,69 which does not affect the jurisdictional fact that to do so brings the government 
under ICC scrutiny as well. While the calculations of individual actors may be complex and 
attenuated, our theoretical expectation is clear: a reduction in the commission of ICC crimes 
post-ratification is consistent with expectations based on direct prosecutorial deterrence.  
We make this argument fully aware that states consciously select into treaties in the first 
place. States may have ratified the ICC for a number of reasons. Simmons and Danner have 
argued that two kinds of states have been especially likely to ratify ICC statutes:70 peaceful 
democracies for whom ratification is likely to be relatively costless71 but also states with a 
history of civil wars and weak institutions, for whom making a credible commitment to reduce 
violence via ratification may be especially valuable. Cultural sources of acceptance and 
resistance also abound. Areas of the world that have adopted western legal forms, such as Latin 
America and parts of Africa, have been willing to ratify the Rome statutes, but ratification in 
Asia, for example, has been explained by a “disconnect between formalized justice processes (as 
exhibited in the ICC) and indigenous or embedded manners of resolving conflict.”72  External 
sources of pressure to ratify should also not be overlooked. A number of studies have found 
external economic dependence to be a significant explanation for ICC ratification.73  For our 
purposes, the most significant threat to our ability to draw inferences about ICC deterrence is 
                                                          
69See Nouwen 2014 for the discussion of the Uganda case. 
70Simmons and Danner 2010.  
71See also Chapman and Chaudoin 2013. 
72Findlay 2014, 87. 
73See Meernik and Shairick 2011; and Goodliffe et al. 2012. 
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likely related to domestic political developments that both encourage ratification and a shift 
away from domestic violence, such as liberal domestic reform.  
Prosecutorial deterrence should also increase as the court demonstrates its will and 
capacity to prosecute.  Governments, military officials, and rebel leaders within the Court’s 
jurisdiction are expected to consider new evidence of the Court’s authority and the prosecutor’s 
determination to investigate, indict, and convict.  For example, the M23 rebel group in the DRC 
publicly expressed its willingness to adhere to international humanitarian law in the aftermath of 
Lubanga’s conviction, and appears to have moderated the extent of war crimes and strengthened 
its soldiers’ discipline in the wake of that case.74 If this example can be generalized, we should 
expect a public display of the Court’s power to strengthen direct prosecutorial deterrence. The 
most powerful boost to deterrence is likely to be within the situation to which the Court’s action 
pertains, but could influence actors more broadly,75 since such interventions display globally the 
authority and determination of the institution to act. ICC crimes should diminish when the Court 
begins an investigation, indicts, or convicts. 
The ICC may exert prosecutorial deterrence indirectly as well.  The complementarity 
mechanism creates incentives for states to develop their own capacity to investigate and try ICC 
crimes.76 Dancy and Sikkink have shown that when states ratify human rights treaties that 
require them to prosecute violators, states are in fact more likely to hold domestic trials.77 
Similarly, we expect ICC crimes to decrease when states implement ICC-consistent statutes, 
when they improve their courts’ capacity to try war criminals, and when they build military 
                                                          
74See Bueno and Angwandi 2012; and Gorur 2012. 
75Sikkink 2011. 
76Slaughter and Burke-White 2006. 
77Dancy and Sikkink 2012.  
19 
 
capacities to detect and punish international crimes.78 It is possible that some states adopt ICC-
statutes in their national laws without intending to improve their criminal justice systems. But a 
number of recent studies suggest that ICC-required reforms have been important in holding 
human rights violators accountable.79   
One of our primary expectations is that extralegal social pressures deter international 
crime as well.  These mechanisms are highly conditional: they depend on the existence of salient 
groups or networks who matter to the target, and who have the ability to apply costly social 
pressure.80 In terms of materially backed social sanctions, we expect state actors that are more 
dependent on foreign assistance to be more likely to be deterred from using tactics that are a 
clear violation of international criminal law.81  But social pressure need not be backed by 
material coercion. We also expect state actors to be deterred by mobilization pressures from 
domestic and international human rights organizations.82 Domestic groups draw attention to 
official actions, raising legitimacy challenges that, at a minimum, have the potential to increase 
the costs to government actors of maintaining power.  Where human rights mobilization is more 
intense locally, government officials and military forces should be more deterred from 
committing international crimes, especially if state officials have raised behavioral expectations 
by ratifying the ICC’s statutes. 
                                                          
78See Morrow 2014 for internal discipline’s importance in the enforcement of laws of war. 
79Grammer 2004; Kleffner 2008; and Dancy and Sikkink 2012 show that states which ratify international treaties 
related to criminal responsibility, including the Rome Statute, tend to initiate human rights prosecutions, compared 
to those without such ratification. Dancy and Montal 2014 provide evidence that ICC investigations led to more 
domestic human rights prosecutions and guilty verdicts in 46 African states between 1999 and 2011.  
80Agnew 2011. 
81Hafner-Burton 2013. 
82Simmons 2009. 
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Unlike state actors, rebel groups rarely have formal institutional mechanisms to 
participate in the creation of international law or to commit themselves to international norms.83 
Vague awareness of the ICC’s jurisdiction, an ability to hide in rough terrain, and in some cases 
exceptional brutality contribute to a weaker expectation of deterrence for many rebel groups.  
Nonetheless, in theory, the ICC has changed the legal context in which rebels operate as well.  
On the one hand, like state officers, rebels may be formally subject to enhanced prosecutorial 
deterrence, since the ICC has the power to investigate situations involving both state and non-
state actors within its jurisdiction. In fact, among the individuals indicted by the ICC,84 about 
half are rebel group leaders.  On the other hand, rebel groups may not be as well informed as 
government officials of the Court’s operation, which could attenuate prosecutorial deterrence 
effects. 
Our social deterrence theory predicts that some rebels may be more deterrable than 
others. Secessionist groups, for example, need to cultivate international legitimacy. Recent 
research suggests they therefore tend to abide by international humanitarian law and refrain from 
civilian abuse, relative to non-secessionist groups.85 This is despite the fact that separatist civil 
wars tend to be brutal and long-lasting, generating many battle-related deaths between 
combatants.86 Furthermore, secessionist groups are more likely to be aware of international 
affairs and to conduct international diplomacy than are non-secessionist counterparts.87  
Consistent with the civil war literature, we would expect any deterrent effect to be stronger to the 
                                                          
83Sivakumaran 2012. 
84Within eight situations, 21 cases, and total 32 defendants, 14 defendants are rebel leaders, 13 had official positions 
in governments. Five have no affiliations. 
85See Fazal 2013; and Jo 2015. 
86Walter 2009. 
87Huang 2013. 
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extent that such groups are able to exert strong command and control over their troops. 88  Table 
1 summarizes our hypotheses. 
  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Prosecutorial and social deterrence effects are not necessarily completely independent 
influences. Prosecutorial deterrence can shape social deterrence over time as investigations, 
arrests, and convictions reinforce broadly shared values, which sharpens the focal power of an 
institution such as the ICC. Heightened social sensitivity can in turn strengthen prosecutorial 
deterrence when civil society actors push for legal reforms and cooperate by reporting, testifying 
and producing evidence in legal proceedings. The international community created the ICC, after 
all, because it wants crimes against civilian populations to stop. Prosecutorial and social 
deterrence are mutually reinforcing, but the latter can matter even if the former is statistically 
unlikely. 
 
Empirical Investigation of the ICC’s Impacts 
 
Sample 
Studying deterrence empirically is a difficult endeavor. The first challenge is to identify a 
relevant population at risk of committing a crime on a scale that might conceivably draw the 
ICC’s attention.89 We need a set of cases where atrocities seem possible, and have therefore 
selected countries that had at least one episode of civil war since 1945. Civil wars are not the 
                                                          
88See Weinstein 2007; Cronin-Furman 2013; and Jo and Thomson 2014. 
89Achen and Snidal 1989. 
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only political context that can generate ICC crimes, but they are likely to increase their 
occurrence among warring parties.90  
Based on this sampling strategy, potential candidates for deterrence are found in 101 
states and involve 264 rebel groups between 1989 and 2011.91 For the case of government 
violations, the unit of observation is the country-year. The resulting data structure is a balanced 
panel for each country for 23 years.92 For the case of rebels, we must account for their varying 
and often shorter life span (average longevity of 4.5 years)93 so we analyze only the years when 
rebel groups were active in an unbalanced panel with each rebel group as a unit. The list of rebel 
groups is from the Non-State Actor (NSA) Dataset,94 which defines a civil war with a threshold 
of 25 battle deaths.  This means we are likely examining the ICC’s deterrence potential vis-à-vis 
rebels that are at least moderately capable of inflicting violence.  
The resulting sample includes all ICC “situations”95 to date – Uganda, the Central 
African Republic, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, and Mali. The countries in the 
sample are diverse in terms of level of violence against civilians (zero to 500,000 killed), 
ratification records (52 had ratified and 49 had not during our observation window), and 
geographic scope (41 African countries, 20 in the Americas, 17 in Asia, 11 in the Middle East, 
and 12 in Europe). The period 1989-2011 includes 13 years before the ICC was established in 
                                                          
90Of the eight ICC situations, six are related to civil wars while Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire involve election violence. 
91See the online appendix for the list of countries and rebel groups.  
92Exceptions include states that were in existence for short periods during these years or that became states after 
1989, such as Yugoslavia (only up to 2002), Croatia (1991-), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-), Tajikistan (1991-), 
Uzbekistan (1991-), and South Sudan (2011-). See Polity IV Project’s Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800//---//2012 (v2013). Available at < http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>. Accessed 6 
January 2014. 
93Authors’ calculation of the rebel sample. 
94Cunningham, Salehyan, and Gleditsch 2013. 
95ICC cases are categorized into “situations,” usually a particular conflict situation in a country. One “situation” can 
include multiple cases involving multiple individuals.   
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2002 and 10 years after, which allows us to assess the change before and after ICC entry into 
force.  
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the number of civilians killed intentionally by government 
forces or rebel groups in a direct military confrontation. The data are culled based on media 
reports, sourced from the One-Sided Violence (OSV) dataset.96  The data exclude indirect events 
such as unintended collateral damage, social demonstrations, or deaths from environmental 
disasters. Intentionality is important for our purposes. Deliberate civilian killing, usually 
generated by superior command, is an egregious rights violation, a crime against humanity, and a 
war crime under ICC jurisdiction. It is clearly one of the major crimes that the ICC was designed 
to deter and to punish.97 We acknowledge it is not the only ICC crime that potentially might be 
deterred,98 but to our knowledge, it is the best available measure to assess the ICC’s impact 
cross-nationally. Relative to other ICC crimes such as rape, intentional killing of civilians is 
more observable and comparable across cases.99 Significant disagreements exist about what 
constitutes a legal case of genocide,100 and it is difficult to tell the age of children when they are 
recruited to military ranks,101 making these other ICC crimes less amenable to systematic testing. 
Nonetheless, if intentional civilian killing can be deterred, this should encourage further research 
                                                          
96Eck and Hultman 2007. The data are available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_one-
sided_violence_dataset/>. Accessed 6 January 2014. We use Version 1.4-2013, 1989//---//2012. 
97Rome Statute, Articles 7 and 8. 
98Schabas 2011. 
99See Cohen et al. 2011 for the difficulty of collecting data on sexual violence. 
100Rome Statute, Articles 7 and 8. 
101Drumbl 2012. 
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into a range of heinous crimes – from sexual violence to trafficking in children to widespread 
pillaging – that the ICC was meant to address.102 
In our sample, the yearly average intentional civilian killing by a government is 34, 
excluding the Rwanda 1994 figure of 50,000.103 The figure for rebel groups is 83. Government 
killing does occasionally occur in non-civil-war years; Kenya’s 2007-2008 election violence is 
one such example. Since OSV data include any case that generates more than 25 civilian 
fatalities. Its standard is different from the definition of civil war given by the Armed Conflict 
Dataset, which is more than 25 battle deaths.104 Consequently, our dataset includes 30% civil 
war years and about 70% non-civil-war years. About 27% of the civil war years and 3% of the 
non-civil-war years in the sample had government-perpetrated civilian killings, corroborating our 
claim that civil wars are breeding grounds for ICC crimes, while showing that they can occur 
(though rarely) during non-civil-war years as well. For the years where OSV data do not specify 
civilian killing counts, we assume zero counts for civilian killing.105  
 
Independent Variables 
We test for direct prosecutorial deterrence with two indicators. One is whether or not the 
state has ratified the Rome Statutes (ICC Ratification), which we expect to be associated with the 
reduction in civilian killing by government actors.  The second indicator is what we call ICC 
                                                          
102To confirm whether the OSV data include most of the cases of political violence involving non-combatants, we 
check our results with the data of State-Sponsored Mass Killing by Ulfelder and Valentino 2008 (data extended to 
2012 by Ulfelder, on file with the authors). Although the criteria for mass killing and civilian killing are different, 
there is more than 90 percent data overlap, suggesting the reliability of the OSV data for our purposes.  
103Including Rwanda 1994, the average is 230 a year. 
104Themnér and Wallensteen 2013. 
105Some of these cases clearly involve no violence; others are uncertain because of the difficulty verifying who 
committed the acts, exact counts, etc. The latter cases are classified and recorded as “unclear” by the OSV project.  
Authors’ correspondence with Therése Pettersson, director of OSV project, 29 November 2011. So, our coding 
decision for all zero outcomes is conservative.  
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Actions. This is a three-year moving average of the collective counts of preliminary examinations, 
investigations, and arrest warrants announced by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), up to the 
previous year.106 This variable signals to actors globally the determination of the OTP to 
prosecute, and we expect it to be associated with the reduction of intentional civilian killing by 
both governments and rebels over time. 
Indirect prosecutorial deterrence via complementarity is captured by Domestic Crime 
Statute, which ranges from 0 (no domestic crime statute dealing with international crimes in 
place), 1 (existing domestic crime statute), 2 (minor reform) to 3 (substantial reform).107  Since 
these cases of legal reform may face difficulties in implementation in societies with weak legal 
institutions,108 we control for the Rule of Law indicator published by the World Bank.109 We 
expect statutory reform to help deter intentional civilian killing by increasing the perceived 
likelihood of meaningful domestic prosecution. 
We proxy a state official’s international susceptibility to material manifestations of social 
pressure with total official development assistance. Aid Pressure is captured by the amount of 
economic aid, multiplied by the reporting counts from the New York Times (reflecting donor 
interest).110  Domestically, social deterrence is likely to be less tangible and should intensify with 
mobilization by human rights organizations (HROs). The growth of HROs is expected to 
stimulate demands for justice, in turn raising legitimacy concerns and governing costs for state 
                                                          
106ICC website available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx>. Accessed 10 May 2014. 
We did not code verdicts because the first one was handed down in 2011, the final year of our study. 
107See the online appendix for coding details and extended discussion and model showing that ICC ratification 
increases the likelihood of strengthening domestic crime statutes. ICC Legal Tools, Implementation Database, 
available at <http://www.legal-tools.org/go-to-database/>. Accessed 19 November 2013. See Table A6 in the online 
appendix.  
108See Terracino 2007; and Open Society Foundation 2010. 
109The Worldwide Governance Indicators available at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
>. Accessed 15 December 2013. 
110Nielsen logs economic aid because of its skew, following the convention in the aid literature. His data are 
available for 1982//---//2004. Nielson 2013. 
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officials and military leaders who commit atrocities. The variable HRO Growth measures the 
incremental number of international and domestic HROs within a country.111 We recognize that 
some human rights organizations are critical of the ICC while others support its efforts, but on 
average this indicator proxies attention to human rights within a polity, capturing demands for 
attention to the plight of victims and challenging the legitimacy of the perpetrator. Both Aid 
Pressure and HRO Growth are interacted with ICC ratification to capture the argument that 
social pressure is strongest when backed by clear expressions of community standards of 
behavior, which we assume is precisely what ratification of the ICC does.  
We also control for the factors that influence ratification and atrocities to ensure that it is 
ICC ratification, not other factors, that reduce violence against civilians. Logic and experience 
suggest that democracies are much less likely to target civilians, so we control for Political 
Regime Type using Polity IV data. We also employ a binary variable, Ongoing Civil War, from 
the PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset to mark years of active civil conflicts.112  To reduce the 
possibility that temporal trends affect our results, we include both year dummies and an indicator 
for the presence of the Court itself, Post ICC Regime, which is zero before 2002 and 1 on and 
after 2002.113  
Finally, we control for states’ preferences for and experiences with other peace and 
justice institutions. A strong preference for peace and reconciliation is indicated by policy 
decisions designed to curtail violent conflict and achieve peaceful conciliation, including the 
                                                          
111Meernik et al. 2012. Available for 1998//---//2007.   
112Themnér and Wallensteen 2013. This dummy variable records both internal and internalized civil conflicts. 
113The online appendix provides a detailed discussion of strategies and tests for dealing with the endogeneity of 
ratification, including consideration of omitted variables, preprocessing cases through matching, and endogenizing 
ratification using instrumental variables. 
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acceptance of peacekeepers114 and the decision to institute amnesty for human rights violations 
that may have been committed in the past. We first combine and then cumulate these experiences 
over time, calling this variable Peace Preference. 115  A preference for justice is proxied by 
policy combinations, including human rights trials and accountability via truth commissions; we 
call this variable Justice Preference.116  Trials and other forms of accountability may influence 
the level of violence in a society;117 here we deploy these accumulated experiences as indicators 
of revealed preferences for justice.  It is important to attempt to model these preferences in 
anticipation of inevitable concerns about endogeneity that we discuss later. 
Data on rebel groups’ characteristics are drawn from the Non-State Actor (NSA) 
Dataset.118 We view Secessionist Rebels as the rebel groups most likely to seek legitimacy, and 
thus most susceptible to various forms of social deterrence.119 We include rebels with autonomy 
aims as well as those involved in secessionist conflicts in this category because many rebel 
groups pursue both goals. Rebel Discipline captures strength of command and control with an 
ordinal measure (low, moderate, high). We also include an ordinal Rebel Strength scale to 
control for the military strength of rebel groups relative to government (much weaker, weaker, 
equal, stronger, much stronger).  All other variables are the same as in the government analysis. 
                                                          
1140=neither peacekeepers nor amnesty policy in place; 1=one of these in place; 2= both in place.  See Hultman, 
Kathman, and Shannon 2013. 
1150=neither peacekeepers nor amnesty policy in place; 1=one of these in place; 2= both in place.  
1160= no international or domestic human rights trials experience; no truth commissions; 1 = experience with one of 
these; 2=experience with two or more; 3=experience with all three.  International tribunal experiences are denoted 
by dummy variables for Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Guatemala and are coded 1 at 
the tribunal’s starting point, and thereafter.  Experience with human rights trials or truth commissions is coded one 
year after the inception of a truth commission or trial and cumulated until the end of our observation window. Data 
source is the Transitional Justice Database, available at <http://www.tjdbproject.com/>. Accessed 21 November 
2013. Lagged variables are used in all the following analyses. 
117Kim and Sikkink 2010. 
118Cunningham, Salehyan, and Gleditsch 2013. The data are available at 
<http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/eacd.html>. Accessed 5 December 2013. 
119In the online appendix, we consider an alternative measure of rebel groups’ legitimacy-seeking characteristics. 
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We first present the results from our analysis of intentional civilian killing by 
governments and then move to the analysis of rebel groups. We use random effects panel 
analysis as our key estimation approach.120 Missing data were imputed to increase efficiency and 
reduce bias.121  
 
Results  
Government Forces 
Table 2 presents the results for government forces. Consistent with our hypothesis about 
prosecutorial deterrence, the significant and negative incidence-rate ratio122 suggests that 
ratification reduces the intentional civilian killing by a factor of .531, compared to non-
ratification. 123  For example, if, hypothetically, 100 civilians were killed by a non-ratifying 
government, our estimates suggest about 53 civilians are likely to be killed, assuming ratification 
with all other control variables held constant (see Figure 1). All specifications control for core 
predictors for civilian killing such as the nature of the political regime, ongoing civil war, 
intentional rebel killing of civilians (to account for the possibility of reciprocity as well as for 
trends in violence over time), and an indicator for before and after the ICC came into force. 
Surprisingly, these models suggest that regime type is not likely to explain intentional civilian 
killing, though active civil wars certainly do.  Governments are also much more likely to commit 
violence against civilians when rebels do so, which suggests that ICC deterrence may contribute 
to breaking cycles of violence committed on both sides of a conflict.   
                                                          
120We use random effects estimation as our goal is to make inferences for a broader sample, not limited to the 
countries in our sample. See Clark and Linzer 2015. Fixed effects estimation, the results of which are consistent with 
our random effects results, is also presented in the online appendix Table A2. 
121King et al. 2001. Amelia II, a program for missing data, was used for this multiple imputation process. 
122See Hilbe 2007 on the calculation and interpretation of incidence-rate ratio in count models.  
123The result holds after eliminating outlier Rwanda in Model 2, a conflict that resulted in 500,000 deaths.  
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
Model 2 looks at the effect of ICC Actions, the three-year moving average of previous 
preliminary examinations, investigations, and warrants by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). 
According to the incidence-rate ratio based on Model 2, one additional investigation each year 
over the three-year term is estimated to reduce intentional civilian killing by a factor of 0.570. 
(See Table 1 for an estimate of lives spared, which is substantial).  Note that the significant effect 
of ICC Actions is robust even after including Post-ICC Regime, a variable that captures the 
Court’s existence, but not its actions. It is therefore quite unlikely that the effect of ICC Actions 
is merely an artifact of some general violence-reducing temporal trend or the result of a passive 
court.  Rather, ICC Actions represent new information, available to all actors, demonstrating that 
the ICC is operational, authoritative, and that the prosecutor means to bring perpetrators to 
justice.  
What of complementarity? Model 3 demonstrates that improvements in Domestic Crime 
Statutes – which are themselves influenced by the presence of the ICC124 – are also associated 
with reduced civilian killing. This effect is robust to the control of Rule of Law, suggesting that it 
is not merely the capacity to enforce but the substantive legal change that is critical. One 
categorical shift toward stronger ICC-consistent domestic legal reform is estimated to reduce 
civilian killing by a factor of 0.61, the substantive impact of which is illustrated in Figure 1.  
                                                          
124In an ordered probit model of improvements in domestic criminal statutes, ratification of the ICC was far more 
important than either regime type or the rule of law in explaining such reforms.  See full results in the online 
appendix, Table A6.  
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Importantly, ratification of the ICC itself has significantly contributed to these reforms.  
Knowing the ICC may step in where domestic institutions fail seems to have encouraged 
domestic legal change, which in turn helps to deter at least some intentional violence against 
civilians by government forces. Model 4 includes all ICC prosecutorial effects simultaneously.  
It demonstrates that ratification, ICC signals of strength via prosecutorial actions, and 
complementarity have all contributed to significant reductions in intentional civilian killing. 
Our second main hypothesis is that state actors can be socially deterred. Extralegal social 
pressure at the domestic level is most likely to be of the non-material sort; e.g., challenges to the 
justness and legitimacy of actions taken by government agents. These challenges are 
hypothesized to be strongest where law focuses social expectations and draws bright lines that 
distinguish unacceptable behavior. The interaction term in Model 5 tests this idea. It shows that 
in addition to whatever effect ratification alone may have, human rights groups are able to 
capitalize on ICC norms to further hold governments accountable to civil society when their state 
has ratified the Rome Statute. The combination of ICC ratification and growth in human rights 
mobilization, captured by the interaction term, is associated with less intentional killing (i.e. a 
negative coefficient), likely through social deterrence but also because human rights 
organizations contribute to prosecutorial risks. Our goal is not to disentangle these effects, but to 
illustrate that they are in fact mutually reinforcing. Interestingly, in the absence of ICC 
ratification, human rights organizations appear to have far less traction. 
Figure 2 plots marginal effects of HRO Growth conditional on ratification, based on the 
estimates from Model 5. The graph shows the change in the predicted count of civilians killed as 
mobilization increases. Since the number of HROs increases about 2 per year on average and 
standard deviation is about 25, we report the graph within 2 standard deviations, from -50 to 50 
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organizations. The marginal effects remain negative between -2 and -7 throughout the entire 
range [-50, 50], indicating that HRO Growth generally decreases civilian killings. But this civil 
society effect is substantially magnified by the focal power and jurisdiction of the ICC: the slope 
given ratification is steeper and more negative than for non-ratifying states. With ICC ratification, 
adding one more human rights organization is estimated to reduce intentional killing by between 
3 and 6 civilians. Without ICC ratification, the effect of increases in HROs is almost flat. 
Theoretically, this is what we would expect if civil society organizations use highly focal legal 
values to hold governments more accountable for their actions.  
Of course, it is possible that both ICC Ratification and HRO Growth are attributable to 
some third factor, such as political liberalization. To address what is essentially a form of 
potential omitted variable bias, we control for political regime type in Table 2 and further 
explore this broader reform thesis in the online appendix using Freedom House measures of 
changes in civil liberties. The evidence suggests that the connection between ratification and 
mobilization is likely not spurious: even controlling for broader governance changes (obviously 
not attributable to ICC ratification), the growth in the number of HROs is strongly connected to 
the reduction in civilian killing only when a state has ratified the ICC statutes.125  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
At the international level, social deterrence may be supported through economic 
dependency relationships. Our results show that while aid itself is not systematically associated 
with a reduction of violence, governments that ratified the ICC Statute were subsequently much 
                                                          
125See Table A5 in the online appendix for supporting evidence. 
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more likely to reduce or to refrain from intentional civilian violence the more aid they received 
(Model 6).  As Figure 3 illustrates, increasing aid reduces violence more with ICC ratification 
than without. Social pressures – in this case, the possibility of losing aid – appear to provide 
important support for international norms. In contrast, without ratification, increasing aid has 
little marginal effect. Similarly, ICC ratification has much weaker effects when states receive no 
foreign aid at all. Social deterrence operates precisely under these interactive conditions: when 
extralegal pressures interact with accepted, focal norms.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Model 7 contains all the ICC-related variables as well as two key proxies for underlying 
preferences for peace and for justice. By including these proxies, we are attempting to show that 
changing underlying proclivities toward peace and justice alone cannot explain the deterrent 
effects we are trying to isolate. Model 7 shows that these two preference proxies do significantly 
influence the likelihood that governments will target civilians. In particular, experience with 
justice and accountability institutions (trials and truth commissions) are correlated with reduced 
killing, while the opposite seems to be true of efforts to reconcile and establish peace. But even 
when we control for such preferences and experiences, our central finding is the same: the ICC 
continues to exert independent deterrence effects of approximately the same magnitude. There is 
a slight decrease in the estimated effect of Domestic Crime Statue reforms, but the sign is 
strongly negative and nearly statistically significant.  
The evidence of the ICC’s ability to deter is based on rigorous controls for many 
underlying conditions that could plausibly contribute both to ratification and reduced civilian 
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killing, such as changing regime type, quality of the rule of law, government-rebel reciprocity 
regarding civilians, even changing experiences and preferences with respect to peace and justice.  
But there may still be concerns that ICC ratification is not causally related to civilian violence.  
One possibility is that some ratifying countries were already in the process of halting civilian 
killing by the late 1990s, and therefore might have selected themselves into ratification.126  To 
account for this potential source of endogeneity, we conduct matching analysis to control for 
important characteristics that may lead some states to ratify in the first place. Using a coarsened 
exact matching algorithm,127 we find results similar to our panel analysis.128 We recognize that 
matching does not completely solve the problem of selection on unobservables. But matching 
does show that the net effect of ratification and ICC-related interventions are strongly 
discernable after controlling for selection into ratification, getting a balanced sample via 
matching between treatment (ratification-years) and control (non-ratification-years), and 
estimating the differences between these cases.   
A second potential threat to inference is the temporal trend of violence. Critics might 
suspect that our results are primarily due to the less brutal nature of more recent conflicts,129 
rather than the ICC itself.  However, we find no particular trend in overall violence between 
1989 and 2011 (Figure 4). Average battle-related deaths world-wide have consistently hovered 
around 500 per year during the last two decades, albeit with a slightly decreasing trend. 
Moreover, the results are robust to the inclusion of period and year dummies. The results in 
                                                          
126See Simmons and Danner 2010; and Chapman and Chaudoin 2013. 
127Iacus, King, and Porro 2012. 
128Detailed procedures and associated results are reported in the online appendix. The appendix also reports results 
for an instrumental variable specification. See Table A4. 
129See Goldstein 2011; Pinker 2011; but see Fazal 2013. 
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support of ICC deterrence are not likely simply a reflection of a decreasingly violent climate.130  
Collectively, the evidence is highly suggestive that the ICC has influenced government tactics 
when it comes to civilian violence.  We now analyze whether the ICC has influenced the 
behavior of non-state actors.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Rebel Groups 
Rebel groups are likely to be the most difficult case for ICC deterrence.  Rebels rarely 
participate in norm consolidation during international negotiations. They are not directly 
responsible to any constituency, have varying motives from secession to self-enrichment, and 
often are located in regions that make their crimes difficult to investigate.  If indicted, they are 
notoriously hard to apprehend.  In the early days of the ICC many rebel groups might not have 
been informed of its jurisdiction or even its existence, although that is changing.    
Table 3 reports the results of civilian killing by rebel groups in a way analogous to that of 
governments in Table 2. It is clear that formal legal change apparently makes no impression on 
rebel groups generally. Neither ICC Ratification (Model 1) nor Domestic Crime Statute (Model 3) 
appears to reduce rebel civilian killing. However, even rebel groups appear to respond to ICC 
Actions (Model 2). Rebels do not respond to legal change alone; they are much more impressed 
with action. The effects are borne out consistently in Model 4, which includes all ICC 
prosecutorial risks. Rebels tend to behave as though they update their estimates of their chances 
of prosecution when the ICC demonstrates its resolve through investigations, warrants and 
                                                          
130Our results also hold when controlling for battle deaths, based on the data from the UCDP.  
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prosecutions. The incidence-rate ratio for ICC Action is .830 [.747, .923].131 Figure 1 illustrates 
the estimated impact for a hypothetical rebel group responsible for some 100 civilian deaths.  We 
estimate that in such a case about 17 individuals might be spared through the deterrent effects 
flowing from investigative and prosecutorial actions by the ICC.  This suggests that rebels are 
likely to alter their tactics in light of new evidence that the prosecutor’s office intends to hold 
actors accountable for their atrocities.  
Models 5 and 6 attempt to capture social deterrence among rebel groups. Rebel groups 
with secessionist aims are in general likely to kill fewer civilians than those without such aims 
(Model 5). We use a triple interaction among Secessionist Rebels, Rebel Discipline, and Post 
ICC Regime in Model 6 to test the idea that secessionist rebels with internal discipline further 
reduce their violence after the ICC regime is in place. The triple interaction term is negative and 
weakly significant, indicating some evidence of social deterrence for a particular class of rebel 
groups. The substantive effects suggest some possibility of social deterrence among rebel groups. 
For example, our estimate suggests that a hypothetical well-organized secessionist movement 
that would have used tactics intentionally leading to the deaths of 100 civilians in the years prior 
to the ICC’s entry into force might have killed “only” 82 civilians after entry into force, holding 
all other variables at their mean.132 The differences are statistically distinguishable and do 
suggest some behavioral moderation after the ICC entered into force. Most importantly, these 
results provide useful guidance on where to look for normative progress among potentially 
violent non-state actors: those with both the incentive and the ability to control their troops. 
                                                          
131This number is calculated from the incident rate ratio (IRR) in Stata. The IRR for ICC Action is .830 [.747, .923]. 
This means that one unit increase of ICC Action variable is expected to decrease the number of civilians by a factor 
of .830, while holding all other variables in the model constant.  
132The marginal effects of civilian killing among secessionist rebel groups with strong command and control is 
estimated at -2.300 [-2.739, -1.861] in the pre-ICC regime and -1.926 [-2.442, -1.410] in the post-ICC regime. To 
create estimates assuming 100 deaths prior to the ICC era, we use the ratio of 2.3 /1.9=100/82. 
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Conclusion 
 
Few issues in international relations are more urgent than improving the life chances for 
civilians who become pawns in civil war violence. Since the end of the Cold War, the 
international community has been groping toward a way to end impunity with respect to the 
worst human rights violations, especially in intrastate conflicts. The Yugoslavian and Rwandan 
Tribunals were important milestones in this regard, but the most ambitious effort to date has been 
the International Criminal Court.  Few institutions have inspired such high hopes, while 
stimulating so much controversy. Even though the Court has been operating for only twelve 
years, it is time to supplement anecdotal speculation with careful study of its effects. As realists 
Goldsmith and Krasner remind us, “ideals can be pursued effectively only if decision-makers are 
alert to … the consequences of their policies.”133  
This study is an attempt to at least address the “chasm between theory and practice” 134 
noted by ICC skeptics.  First, we have been careful to specify exactly what it is we might expect 
the ICC to do: to deter a significant crime category within its jurisdiction. This is not the only 
consequence one might want to explore relating to the ICC, but it is one of its primary goals. 
Civilian suffering as the result of intentional, strategic behavior by combatants has been one of 
the more tragic outcomes of the explosion of civil wars in the past two decades.  
                                                          
133Goldsmith and Krasner 2003, 48. 
134Ibid., 55. 
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Second, we have theorized two broad and mutually reinforcing channels of potential 
deterrence – prosecutorial and social deterrence – and specified the conditions under which we 
might expect them to hold.  We have argued that the ICC contributes directly to prosecutorial 
deterrence by investigating and prosecuting international crimes on its own authority. It also 
encourages member states to improve their capacity to reduce, detect, and prosecute such crimes 
domestically. Indeed, ratifying states are much more likely than non-ratifiers to do so. As well, 
there is strong evidence of a reduction in intentional civilian killing by government actors when 
states implement ICC-consistent statutes in domestic criminal law, which we can reasonably 
attribute, at least indirectly, to the ICC’s influence. Such domestic statutes magnify the ICC’s 
prosecutorial deterrent effect by bolstering it with the added possibility of punishment at home. 
Finally, it is critical to understand that legal rules interact with social pressures, both tangible 
and intangible. The ICC also deters because it mobilizes the international community as well as 
domestic civil society to demand justice. In this sense, our view of the ICC is fully consistent 
with broader trends in human rights prosecutions at the local, regional and global level.135    
We want to stress that our claims are modulated. Persons who intentionally terrorize 
civilians for their personal or political purposes are difficult to deter under any circumstances.  
But the ICC has raised the risks of consequences for violations, through the channels we 
discussed. We illustrate the plausibility of these channels but also demonstrate their limits. 
Governments that depend on aid relationships are easier to deter than the more self-reliant, 
largely because their economic dependence makes them more vulnerable to external actors who 
use their resources to enforce broader community values. Rebels are harder to deter than 
governments. Nonetheless, even rebels appear to have significantly reduced intentional civilian 
                                                          
135Sikkink 2011. 
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killing when the ICC has signaled its determination to prosecute. Debates over the effects of the 
ICC have been sterile, largely because they have failed to specify the conditions under which one 
might expect the Court to work. 
We are not pushing the point that one prosecutor, acting alone and without significant 
backing by the international community or local support, could have brought about these 
consequences merely by issuing a decision to investigate or signing a warrant. ICC interventions 
are powerful because they are part of a package of efforts to rally support for ending impunity. 
Moreover, part of the package has taken time to unfold – a redoubling of domestic efforts to 
develop the legal capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity and other egregious rights 
abuses, which is precisely how the ICC’s complementarity is intended to operate. The evidence 
suggests these efforts contributed to an indirect prosecutorial effect of the ICC itself, though only 
for government officials. But the evidence also suggests that the ICC’s demonstrated 
determination to investigate and issue warrants has contributed to the reduction of violence by 
convincing even some types of rebel leaders that impunity is a waning option.   
We are under no illusions that the Court has positive impacts in all cases.  These are 
average results, based on imperfectly measured exposures to prosecutorial and social risks and 
costs. Our theory as well as empirical analysis of prosecutorial deterrence is probabilistic, not 
deterministic.  It is easy to point to conflicts that the ICC has not solved. The Bemba trial in 
relation to the situation in the Central African Republic did not stop violence by the Seleka 
faction, which reminds us that the Court cannot solve deep-rooted social problems in a short 
period of time.136 However,  the Prosecutor prioritizes cases where violations are “grave”137 and 
                                                          
136Glasius 2009b. 
137 ICC 2012, 6. 
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these are precisely cases where violence is prone to recur. ICC situations are some of the most 
protracted cases of conflict in the world – a fact that makes the modest positive consequences we 
document all the more remarkable. 
The Court had its ten-year anniversary in 2012. It has yet to gain consistent support from 
major powers like the US, China, Russia, and India which would boost its resources and 
legitimacy. Although the ICC enjoys the support of 123 countries, observers note that the court 
faces many practical challenges in its day-to-day operations, such as gathering evidence and 
conducting quality fact-finding.138  In many respects we agree. But its willingness to prosecute 
has contributed to perceptions that impunity for egregious crimes against humanity is a 
diminishing option. The evidence suggests that this role has potential to save at least a few lives 
in some of the most violent settings in recent decades.   
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TABLE 1. Expectations 
I. Prosecutorial deterrence 
hypotheses: 
 
Direct: 
 
 
 
A. Ratification of the ICC statutes is associated with a 
reduction of violence against civilians by state actors. 
B. ICC actions, such as preliminary examinations, 
investigations, and prosecutions are associated with a 
reduction of violence against civilians by both state and 
non-state actors. 
 
Indirect:  A. Civilian killing should decrease when states implement 
ICC-consistent domestic criminal statutes. 
 
  
II. Social deterrence 
hypotheses: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Civilian killing by government forces should decrease the 
greater a state’s dependence on foreign aid. 
B. Civilian killing by governments should decrease when 
human rights organizations are mobilized to demand 
accountability. 
C. Civilian killing should decrease for secessionist rebel groups 
with internal discipline. 
All of these effects (IIA-IIC) should be amplified where the 
ICC is in force. 
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TABLE 2. ICC effect on civilian killing by governments 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 ICC ratification ICC actions ICC 
complementarity 
All ICC effects Social 
deterrence - 
mobilization 
Social 
deterrence - aid 
Underlying 
preferences 
        
ICC Ratification -0.632**   -0.482* -0.553** 0.108 -0.508* 
 (0.261)   (0.267) (0.265) (0.317) (.270) 
ICC Actions  -0.562***  -0.524**   -0.490** 
  (0.209)  (0.208)   (0.210) 
Domestic Crime Statute   -0.489** -0.397*   -0.344 
   (0.215) (0.222)   (0.230) 
Ratification*Aid Pressure      -0.074***  
      (0.024)  
Aid Pressure      0.010  
      (0.007)  
Ratification*HRO Growth     -0.022*   
     (0.013)   
HRO Growth     0.003   
     (0.004)   
Peace Preference       0.397*** 
 
Justice Preference 
      (0.135) 
-0.391*** 
       (0.155) 
Political Regime Type -0.008 -0.017 -0.013 -0.007 -0.013 -0.011 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Rule of Law -0.439*** -0.427*** -0.400*** -0.417*** -0.439*** -0.443*** -0.373*** 
 (0.120) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.125) (0.125) (0.121) 
On-going Civil War  2.216*** 2.263*** 2.225*** 2.199*** 2.172*** 2.188*** 2.076*** 
 (0.210) (0.211) (0.210) (0.210) (0.220) (0.222) (0.211) 
Rebel Killing 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Post ICC Regime 1.960*** 1.882*** 1.898*** 1.954*** 1.646** 1.770** 1.891*** 
 (0.678) (0.680) (0.677) (0.675) (0.739) (0.744) (0.674) 
Observations 2,264 2,264 2,264 2,264 2,163 2,163 2,264 
Number of countries 101 101 101 101 100 100 101 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the count of civilians killed intentionally by government forces. Results are based on a 
negative binomial panel analysis with random effects. Year fixed effects are included but not reported. Constants are suppressed. 
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*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10  
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TABLE 3. ICC effect on civilian killing by rebel groups 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 ICC ratification ICC actions ICC complementarity All ICC effects Social deterrence 
without ICC 
Social deterrence 
with ICC 
       
ICC Ratification 0.287   0.328   
 (0.222)   (0.223)   
ICC Actions  -0.186***  -0.197***   
  (0.0540)  (0.0553)   
Domestic Crime Statute   0.138 0.197   
   (0.118) (0.124)   
Rule of Law   0.214** 0.198*   
   (0.102) (0.103)   
Secessionist Rebels     -0.641*** -1.086** 
     (0.144) (0.423) 
Secessionist*Discipline*Post ICC      -0.172 
      (0.121) 
Secessionist*Discipline      0.285 
      (0.200) 
Discipline*Post ICC      0.628*** 
      (0.185) 
Discipline/Central Command and 
Control 
     -0.404*** 
      (0.124) 
Political Regime Type -0.0393*** -0.0368*** -0.0584*** -0.0553*** -0.0260** -0.0310*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
Post ICC Regime 0.106 0.456*** 0.0975 0.342** 0.123 -0.994*** 
 (0.127) (0.140) (0.125) (0.147) (0.122) (0.364) 
Rebel Strength 0.216** 0.232*** 0.263*** 0.259*** 0.185** 0.271*** 
 (0.0895) (0.0892) (0.0936) (0.0935) (0.0895) (0.0938) 
Government Killing 0.00000891*** 0.0000089*** 0.00000898*** 0.00000897*** 0.00000888*** 0.00000891*** 
 (0.000000959) (0.000000951) (0.000000946) (0.000000953) (0.00000094) (0.00000103) 
Observations 2,196 2,196 2,196 2,196 2,196 2,196 
Number of rebel groups 260 260 260 260 260 260 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses . The dependent variable is the count of civilians killed by rebel groups. Results are based on a negative binomial panel 
analysis with random effects. Constants are suppressed.  
*** p<0.01 
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** p<0.05 
* p<0.10 
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FIGURE 1. Estimated effect of prosecutorial risks on intentional civilian killing 
 
 
 
Note: Figure 1 illustrates the estimated effect of three indicators of increased ICC 
prosecutorial risk on a hypothetical government or rebel group that has 
intentionally killed 100 civilians in a given year. For such a case 100 deaths 
represent “no effect.” The estimated deaths given a one-unit shift in the 
prosecutorial variable noted with a point estimate and 95% confidence interval. 
They are based on the incidence-rate ratios estimated from Models 1-3 in Table 2 
(for governments) and from Models 1-3 in Table 3 (for rebels). The estimated 
effect of Ratification is from Model 1; ICC Action is from Model 2; and Domestic 
Crime Statute is from Model 3.  
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ICC_Action
Domestic_Crime_Statute
50 100 150 200
Governments Rebels
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FIGURE 2. Marginal effects of mobilization on civilian killing 
conditional on ICC ratification 
 
 
Note: The marginal effects are predicted counts of yearly average civilian 
killing by a government actor. The effects were calculated based on Model 
5 in Table 2. The effects are reported for the values within ±2 standard 
deviation of HRO Growth variable. 
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FIGURE 3. Marginal effects of aid pressure on civilian killing 
conditional on ICC ratification 
 
Note: The marginal effects are predicted counts of yearly average civilian 
killing by a government actor. The effects were calculated based on Model 
6 in Table 2. The effects are reported for the values within ±3 standard 
deviation of Aid Pressure variable. 
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FIGURE 4. Battle-related deaths and government civilian killing  
 
Note: Battle-related Deaths are from UCDP’s Battle-related Deaths Dataset v.5-
2013. Civilian Killing Counts are from the One-sided Violence Dataset v.1.4-
2013. See Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2013; and Eck and Hultman 2007. 
Rwanda drives the peak in 1994. The OSV data records that the Hutu government 
killed 15000 Tutsis but the number is not counted as “battle-related” in the UCDP 
data. 
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